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EMPLOYMENT LAW 
THE LIMITS OF DEFERENCE: THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT REJECTS EEOC GUIDELINES ON 
ENGLISH-ONLY RULES IN THE 
WORKPLACE - GARCIA v. SPUN STEAK 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Garcia v. Spun Steak CO, l the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld an employer's use of a 
rule which required employees to speak only English while on 
the job. The court concluded that Spun Steak Company's Eng-
lish-only rule did not violate § 703(a)(1) of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act as amended (hereinafter "Title VII")2 by discrimi-
nating against bilingual Hispanic employees on the basis of 
national origin. In rendering its decision, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected employees' use of § 1606.7 of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission3 ("EEOC") guidelines, which would 
have placed the initial burden on Spun Steak Company to 
1. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (per O'Scannlain, 
J., joined by Noonan, J.; Boochever, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); 
reh'g en banc denied, 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994). 
2. Throughout this article, the term "Civil Rights Act of 1964" and "Title VII" 
refers to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended as it existed prior to the passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
3. The EEOC is one of the administrative agencies charged with enforcing 
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1988); see Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 
433-34 (1971); see also UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMIS-
SION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CML RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 
at 3258-3372 (1978) (discussing the legislative background for the enforcement and 
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justify its rule. Instead, the court placed the initial burden on 
the employees to establish a prime facie case of discrimination 
by showing that the rule created a significant adverse impact. 
Spun Steak represents a return to the Ninth Circuit's earlier 
approach of requiring an employee challenging an English-only 
rule to establish a prima facie case.4 
This comment will show that the court's holding in Spun 
Steak, while consistent with Congressional intent and prior 
judicial policy, failed to provide the most compelling reason for 
rejecting the EEOC guideline, namely that the guideline vio-
lates both judicial policy and the plain language of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, both of which require a plaintiff to-estab-
lish a prima facie case.5 This comment will then show that the 
court's decision in Spun Steak failed to provide the necessary 
guidance to lower courts.6 Finally, this comment will show 
that by adopting an alternative approach that classifies Eng-
lish-only rules as facially discriminatory, courts would ease the 
burden on a plaintiff establishing a prima facie case without 
encountering the problems inherent in the EEOC's guideline. 7 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Spun Steak Company is a small California corporation 
that produces poultry and meat products for wholesale distri-
bution.s The company employs twenty-four Spanish-speaking 
workers, most of whom are Hispanic.9 Several non Spanish-
speaking employees complained that some Spanish-speaking 
4. See, e.g., Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that a bilingual disc jockey who was fired for violating a radio station's on-air 
English-only policy had failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact); 
c.f. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 
490 U.S. 1016 (1989) (finding that the mere existence of an English-only rule had 
a discriminatory impact on Hispanic employees). See infra notes 70-79 and accom-
panying text for a full discussion of Jurado. See also notes 80-94, infra, and ac-
companying text for a discussion of Gutierrez. 
5. See infra notes 146-164 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 165-168 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 169-186 and accompanying text. 
8. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993). 
9. [d. Approximately two-thirds of the company's employees are production 
line workers who remove poultry and other meat products from a conveyor belt 
and then package them for resale. [d. 
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employees made derogatory remarks in Spanish. lO The presi-
dent of the company, Kenneth Bertelson, decided that an Eng-
lish-only rule would enhance worker safetyll and dispel the 
hostile atmosphere which apparently existed.12 An English-
only rule was enacted in September or October 1990.13 In No-
vember 1990, Garcia and Buitrago were warned against speak-
ing Spanish on the job.14 Thereafter, they were separated 
from one another on the production line for conversing in 
Spanish. 15 
Garcia and Buitrago (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") challenged 
the company's rule16 by filing suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California. 17 Plain-
tiffs 18 alleged that Spun Steak's English-only rule violated 
10. [d. Plaintiffs Garcia and Buitrago are fully bilingual, speaking both Span-
ish and English. [d. 
11. Appellees disputed this assertion, claiming that the safety of the workers 
was never an issue but only a post-hoc justification for the rule. See Appellees' 
Answering Brief at 5, Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (No. 
91-16733). 
12. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483. Spun Steak received complaints that Garcia 
and Buitrago made derogatory remarks in Spanish about African-American and 
Chinese-American employees. [d. 
13. See id. The text of the rule reads: 
It is hereafter the policy of this Company that only Eng-
lish will be spoken in connection with work. During 
lunch, breaks, and employees' own time, they are obvious-
ly free to speak Spanish if they wish. However, we urge 
all of you not to use your fluency in Spanish in a fashion 
which may lead other employees to suffer humiliation. 
[d. In addition to this policy, the company adopted a rule that forbade offensive 
racial, sexual or personal remarks of any kind. [d. 
14. [d. It was not clear from the record whether the company strictly enforced 
its rule. [d. According to Garcia and Buitrago, some workers continued to speak 
Spanish without incident. [d. The company issued written exceptions to the rule 
allowing its clean-up crew, a foreman, and certain workers at the discretion of 
that foreman to speak Spanish. [d. It appears that only bilingual and multilingual 
speakers were affected by this rule. See id. 
15. See id. 
16. [d. at 1483-84. 
17. [d. at 1484. First, Garcia and Buitrago filed a charges with the EEOC. [d. 
at 1483. The EEOC conducted an investigation and determined that plaintiffs had 
reasonable cause to believe that the company's rule violated Title VII § 703(a)(1) 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. [d. at 1483-84. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed this law-
suit. [d. at 1483. 
18. Local 115 (United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, 
AFL-CIO) was also a named plaintiff, representing collectively the Spanish-speak-
ing employees. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1484. The Ninth Circuit held that 
3
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Title VII by discriminating against them on the basis of na-
tional origin.19 On cross motions for summary judgment, the 
district court granted plaintiffs' motion and denied the 
company's motion, finding that the rule disparately impacted 
Hispanic workers without sufficient business justification.20 
Spun Steak appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.21 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. NATIONAL ORIGIN UNDER TITLE VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196422 prohibits em-
ployers from discriminating against employees on the basis of 
"national origin."23 Title VII does not itself provide a defini-
tion of the term "national origin.,,24 However, the United 
States Supreme Court, in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing 
CO.,25 defined national origin as the country from where a per-
son was born or the country from which his or her ancestors came.26 




22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
23. Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Civil Rights Act of 1964 definitions). 
25. 414 U.S. 86 (1973). 
26. 1d. at 88. The Court noted that the legislative history supported this con-
struction. 1d. at 88-89. (quoting Congressman Roosevelt's statement that national 
origin, "means the country from which you or your forebears came from. b 1d. at 
89. (citing 110 Congo Rec. 2549 (1964), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TI-
TLES VII AND XI, supra note 3, at 3179-80 (1978». 
The Court also noted that the deletion of the word "ancestry" from the final 
4
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In 1980, the EEOC revised its "Guidelines on Discrimina-
tion Because of National Origin. ,,27 The EEOC guidelines de-
fine national origin broadly as including an individual's, or his 
or her ancestor's, place of origin; or the physical, cultural, or 
linguistic characteristics of that individua1.28 
Courts have been willing to include linguistic characteris-
tics such as a person's accent under the auspices of Title 
VII.29 However, courts have been more reluctant to include 
language itself as an identifying trait of national origin. 30 
B. THEORIES OF LIABILITY 
Under Title VII a plaintiff may proceed under two theories 
of liability: disparate impact theory or the disparate treatment 
theory.31 While disparate treatment theory requires proof of 
discriminatory intent, disparate impact theory does not require 
proof of such intent.32 
version of § 703 was not meant to be a material change, suggesting the terms 
"ancestry" and "national origin" were considered synonymous. Id. (citing H.R. REP. 
No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 (1963». 
27. 29 C.F.R. § 16.06.1 (1980). The EEOC guidelines were originally adopted 
in 1970 in response to charges filed by individuals alleging that they were denied 
equal employment opportunity because their last names were associated with per-
sons, schools, churches, and other lawful organizations identified with certain na-
tional origin groups. Id. . 
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1993). The guidelines state that the EEOC "defines 
national origin discrimination broadly as including, but not limited to, the denial 
of equal employment opportunity because of an individual's, or his or her 
ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or 
linguistic characteristics of a national origin group." 
29. See, e.g., Fragrante v. City of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(stating that accent and national origin are inextricably intertwined in many cas-
es), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1989); Berke v. Ohio Dept. of Public Welfare, 30 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 387 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (stating that it is reasonable to 
assume that a person speaking with an accent has a national origin other than 
that of the United States), af/'d, 628 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1980). 
30. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (refusing to equate 
the language a bilingual person chooses to use with national origin), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 1113 (1981). 
31. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1987). See also 
§ 1606.2 of the EEOC guidelines which provide in part: "[tlhe Title VII principles 
of disparate treatment and adverse impact equally apply to national origin dis-
crimination." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.2 (1993). 
32. Watson, 487 U.S. at 988. 
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1. Disparate Impact 
The United States Supreme Court first advanced the dis-
parate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power CO. 33 Disparate 
impact claims arise when facially neutral employment practic-
es34 affect a group protected under Title VII more harshly 
than another group and cannot be justified by business neces-
sity.35 Whether or not an employer intended to discriminate is 
irrelevant under the disparate impact theory.3s In order to 
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that a 
particular facially neutral employment policy or practice has a 
significant discriminatory impact on the protected group to 
which the plaintiff belongs.37 In a typical disparate impact 
33. 401 u.s. 424 (1971). 
34. Courts generally have defined the meaning of neutrality broadly, to include 
all employment policies and practices that do not specifically mention a class cov-
ered by Title VII. See STEPHEN SHULMAN & CHARLES ABERNATHY, THE LAw OF 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT, 2-12 to 2-14 (1990) (describing the various 
selection criteria and employment requirements the courts have analyzed using the 
Griggs analysis). 
Courts generally have been willing to define English-only rules as facially 
neutral. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980) (equating an 
English-only rule with a rule barring employees from smoking), cert. denied 449 
U.S. 1113 (1981). This view has been subject to criticism. One commentator has 
stated that the full impact of an English-only rule will fall exclusively on members 
of protected groups whose primary language is not English. Juan F. Perea, Eng~ 
lish·only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary Language in the Workplace, 
23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 265, 289-90 (1990) (citing Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair 
Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 298-99 (1971)). Perea argues that an 
English-only rule should not be described as "facially neutral," but instead be the 
"functional equivalent" of national origin discrimination. [d. at 289-90. 
35. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 
(1977). By definition, disparate impact cases are concerned with discrimination 
against a group or class of persons. See generally SHULMAN & ABERNATHY, supra 
note 34, at 2-11 to 2-12. 
36. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory 
intent does not redeem employment procedures . . . that operate as 'built in 
headwinds' for minority groups . . . ." [d. 
37. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
codified the burden placed on a plaintiff to make the prima facie case of disparate 
impact. Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended to provide that: 
With respect to demonstrating that a particular employ-
ment practice causes a disparate impact. . . the com-
plaining party shall demonstrate that each particular 
challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, 
except that if the party can demonstrate to the court that 
the elements of a respondent's decision making process 
are not capable of separation for analysis, the decision 
6
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claim, the plaintiff will use comparative statistics38 to show 
that the employment policy adversely affected the protected 
class. Generally, courts determine what constitutes significant 
discriminatory impact on a case-by-case basis.39 
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the burden of production40 shifts to the defen-
making process may be analyzed as one employment prac-
tice. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. III 1991). 
38. For a discussion of the role statistics play in virtually all disparate impact 
cases, see generally, BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION LAw, 1331-1391 (2nd ed. 1983). See also CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET 
AL., 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 166-81 (2nd ed. 1988) (examining the 
various mathematical models used in disparate impact claims). 
39. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN supra note 38, at 98-99. See also Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank, 487 U.S. 977, 996 n.3 (1988) "At least at this stage of the law's 
development we believe that such a case-by-case approach properly reflects our 
recognition that statistics 'come in infinite variety and . . . their usefulness de-
pends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.'" [d. (quoting Internation-
al Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977» (ellipses in origi-
nal). 
40. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, both the burdens of production and 
persuasion shift to the defendant. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
Section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amends § 703 of Title VII to 
provide: 
An unlawful employment practice based on dispa-
rate impact is established under this title only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respon-
dent uses a particular employment practice that causes a 
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate 
that the challenged business practice is job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessi-
ty; or 
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration 
described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alterna-
tive employment practice and the respondent refuses to 
adopt such alternative employment practice. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(k)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1991). "Demonstrate" is defined as meeting 
both the burdens of production and persuasion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (Supp. III 
1991). 
It is not clear whether the court in Spun Steak followed the law as it exist-
ed prior to, or subsequent to, the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The effective date of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was November 21, 1991. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)-
(n). However, the Act was silent as to whether it was to apply to cases pending 
before the courts on that date. See generally CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION xix-xxxiii (2nd ed. supp. 1992) (discussing the evidence 
for and against the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to pending cases). 
The plaintiffs filed charges of discrimination against Spun Steak with the EEOC 
7
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dant to demonstrate a business necessity for the challenged 
employment practice.41 Title VII does not define "business 
necessity." The federal courts have applied a number of differ-
ent interpretations to "business necessity" or "job related-
ness.,,42 
on May 6 1991. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483. Both Parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgement on September 6, 1991. Id. at 1484. The district court filed its 
decision in favor of the plaintiffs on October 23, 1991. Garcia v. Spun Steak, C-91-
1941 RHS, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16484 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1991). 
In two recent decisions the Supreme Court ruled that provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 do not apply retroactively. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 
114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994), the Court held that § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
dealing with remedies in cases of intentional discrimination, did not apply to cases 
arising before its enactment. Id. at 1505-08. In Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 
114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994), the Court held that § 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
defining the term "make and enforce contracts," did not apply retroactively. Id. at 
1518-20. 
While neither case dealt with the particular provisions that would be appli-
cable in a disparate impact action, the cases do indicate that the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act as it existed prior to the passage of the 1991 amendments is the con-
trolling law in Spun Steak. If the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply to Spun 
Steak, then the controlling law would be Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 
U.S. 642 (1989). Here, only the burden of producing evidence shifts to the defen-
dant. Id. at 659-60. Whether the burden that shifts to the employer is the bur-
den of persuasion or merely the burden of producing evidence was open to inter-
pretation before Watson v. Fort Worth Bank, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plurality opin-
ion) (stating that the burden that shifts is the burden of production). This view 
was later adopted by the mlijority of the Court in Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 659-
60. Prior to Watson, the nature of the burden in a disparate impact case was an 
open question. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 1328-29 (discussing the 
pre-Watson analysis). See generally Samuel R. Zuck, Shifting Burdens of Proof 
Under Disparate Impact Analysis: Conflict and Problems of Characterization, 27 
DUQ. L. REV. 535 (1989). 
41. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 446-47. The respondent may either attack the 
plaintiffs showing of disparate impact or show that the employment practice is 
justified by business necessity. SHULMAN & ABERNATHY, supra note 34, at 43-44. 
42. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32 ("manifest relationship;" "demonstrable 
relationship"); Dothard v. Rawlingson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977) ("A discrimi-
natory employment practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient 
job performance to survive a Title VII challenge"); see generally SCHLEI, supra note 
38, at 1328-30 n.141 (listing various Supreme Court and circuit court cases and 
their respective interpretations of business necessity). See also Marcus B. Chan-
dler, Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate Impact Liability Under 
Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911 (1979) (discussing lower courts interpretation of 
the Griggs standard). Chandler argues that "[t)he theoretical underpinnings of the 
business necessity defense, the legislative history of Title VII, and the Supreme 
Court's interpretations of that history all suggest that business necessity means 
nothing more than legitimate business purpose." Id. at 933. Cf. Watson, 487 U.S. 
at 998 (holding that the defendant met its burden of producing evidence that its 
employment practices are based on legitimate business reasons). 
8
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Finally, once a defendant has satisfied his burden of dem-
onstrating business necessity, the plaintiff must be afforded an 
opportunity to show that other employment practices, without 
similar discriminatory effects, would serve the employer's legit-
imate business interest.43 Such a showing would demonstrate 
that the employer's practice was merely a "pretext" for discrim-
ination.44 
2. Disparate Treatment 
Disparate treatment claims arise when, the employer 
treats some people less favorably than others because of their 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.45 In disparate 
treatment claims proof of discriminatory motive is critical, 
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere 
fact of differences in treatment."46 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green ,47 the Supreme 
Court established the order of proof in a disparate treatment 
claim. First, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establish-
ing a prima facie case of discrimination.4s The plaintiff need 
only produce evidence to raise an inference of discrimina-
tion.49 Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, 
43. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citing McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973». 
44. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05). 
45. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
46. Id. 
47. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
48. Id. at 802. The Court in McDonnell Douglas set out a four part test for 
indirectly making out a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The plaintiff 
must show: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority, (ii) that he ap-
plied and was qualified for a job which the employer was 
seeking applicants, (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he 
was rejected, and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek appli-
cations from persons of complainant's qualifications. 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court elaborated: "The facts necessarily 
will vary in Title VII cases, and the specifications above the prima facie proof 
required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing 
factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13. 
See generally SeHLE! & GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 13-22 (discussion of 
the disparate treatment theory). 
49. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
9
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the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate 
either a legitimate non-discriminatory reason50 or a bona fide 
occupational qualification for the discriminatory treatment. 51 
Once the defendant has satisfied this burden, the plaintiff 
must be afforded an opportunity to show that the defendant's 
stated reason was a pretext for a discriminatory motive. 52 
Most cases are decided at the pretext stage. 53 The plaintiff 
may show pretext through direct evidence of the defendant's 
motive, or the court may infer discriminatory intent through 
plaintiff's use of statistical or comparative evidence.54 
C. ENGLISH-ONLY RULES IN THE WORKPLACE 
In December of 1980, the EEOC promulgated its current 
national origin guidelines on the subject of English-only rules 
in the workplace. 55 Section 1606.7 of the EEOC's guidelines 
50. [d. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
The Court in Burdine held that "[tJhe ultimate burden of persuading the trier of 
fact that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times 
with the plaintiff." [d. at 253. 
51. Section 703(e) of Title VII provides in pertinent part: 
[I]t shall not be unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer . . . to admit or employ any individual . . . on the 
basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those cer-
tain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a 
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary 
to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). 
52. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. 
53. SeHLE! & GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 14. 
54. [d. at 14-15. 
55. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1980). The EEOC stated that it "is revising its Guide-
lines on Discrimination Because of National Origin to clarify them and to specifi-
cally inform the public of unlawful employment practices which discriminate on 
the basis of national origin." Section 1606.7 provides: 
A rule requiring employees to speak only English at all 
times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condi-
tion of employment. The primary language of an individu-
al is often an essential national origin characteristic. Pro-
hibiting employees at all times, in the workplace, from 
speaking their primary language or the language they 
speak most comfortably, disadvantages an individual's 
employment opportunities on the basis of national origin. 
It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation 
and intimidation based on national origin which could 
result in a discriminatory working environment. Therefore, 
10
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creates a rebuttable presumption that English-only rules in the 
workplace violate Title VII.56 English-only rules are upheld 
only if employers can show a business necessity justifying the 
enactment of such rules.57 Therefore, under the EEOC's 
scheme, a plaintiff need only show the existence of an English 
only rule in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. 
1. Fifth Circuit Case Law: Garcia v. Gloor 
Section 1606.7 was promulgated by the EEOC partly in 
response to a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion upholding 
the validity of an English-only rule in the workplace.58 In 
the Commission will presume that such a rule violates 
Title VII and will closely scrutinize it. . . . An employer 
may have a rule requiring that employees speak only in 
English at certain times where the employer can show 
that the rule is justified by business necessity .... It is 
common for individuals whose primary language is not 
English to inadvertently change from speaking English to 
speaking their primary language. Therefore, if an employ-
er believes it has a business necessity for a speak-Eng-
lish-only rule at certain times, the employer should inform 
its employees of the general circumstances when speaking 
only in English is required and of the consequences of 
violating the rule . . . . 
29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1980) 
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a). 
57. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b). According to the EEOC, an example of business 
necessity might be "where safety requires that all communications be in English 
so that everyone can closely follow a particular task, such as, surgery or drilling 
of oil wells or where a salesperson is attending to English-speaking customers." 45 
Fed. Reg. 85,635 (1980). 
Id. 
58. 45 Fed. Reg. 85,635. According to the EEOC: 
As the Court noted in Garcia v. Gloor, 616 F.2d 264, 266 
n.l (5th Cir. 1980), the Commission's previous Guidelines 
did not give any standards for testing employer rules 
which prohibit the use of languages other than English. 
The purpose of § 1606.7 is to provide this guidance. The 
Commission's concern is to prevent employers from impos-
ing speak English-only rules, as arbitrary and oppressive 
terms and conditions of employment, on people who come 
from non English-speaking backgrounds in order to de-
prive them of an equal employment opportunity for jobs 
they are otherwise fully qualified to perform. 
For a discussion on the history of EEOC guidelines dealing with English-
only rules and the history of English-only rules case law, see Robert R. Oliva, 
11
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Garcia v. Gloor,59 the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of 
whether a lumber company violated Title VII by discharging a 
bilingual employee for disregarding its English-only rule. 
Gloor Lumber and Supply Company enacted a rule requir-
ing its employees to speak English unless the employees were 
assisting non English-speaking customers.60 Gloor Lumber 
discharged Hector Garcia, a bilingual salesperson of Mexican-
American descent, for violating the rule after he responded to 
a question from another employee in Spanish.61 Garcia sued 
claiming that the rule disparately impacted Spanish-speaking 
employees by denying them a privilege of employment enjoyed 
by English-speaking employees, namely speaking in the lan-
guage that is most comfortable to them.62 
The district court ruled in favor of the employer. 63 On 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the employer's use of the Eng-
lish-only rule, stating that "there is no disparate impact if the 
rule is one that the affected employee can readily observe and 
nonobservance is a matter of individual preference."64 The 
court compared the English-only rule to a rule that prohibits 
smoking in the workplace.65 The court stated that "[Title VII] 
would not condemn that rule merely because it is shown that 
most of the employees of one race smoke, most of the employ-
ees of another do not and it is more likely that a member of 
the race more addicted to tobacco would be disciplined."66 
In analyzing whether Title VII prohibits English-only rules 
English-Only Rules In The Workplace: The Ninth Circuit Attempts to Redefine The 
Parameters, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 99 (1990) (discussing the evolution of 
English-only rules administrative law, case law and administrative promulgations). 
59. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). 
60. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266. Several employees who only spoke Spanish were 
exempt from the policy. See id. 
61. Id. The court noted that while Garcia was not discharged merely for vio-
lating the English-only rule, "[tlhe record would support a finding that Mr. 
Garcia's use of Spanish was a significant factor and therefore, rather than remand 
for a determination by the trial court, we will assume for present purposes that it 
was." Id. at 268. 
62. See id. 
63. Id. at 266. 
64. Id. at 270. 
65. Id. 
66. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270. 
12
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in the workplace, the Gloor court noted that no EEOC guide-
line addressed the matter.67 The Gloor court upheld the 
employer's rule and the decision to discharge Garcia for violat-
ing the rule.68 The EEOC responded by promulgating § 
1606.7.69 
2. Ninth Circuit Case Law 
In 1987, seven years after the Gloor case, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.,70 addressed the issue of 
whether an employer violated Title VII by discharging an em-
ployee for speaking Spanish.71 In that case, the program direc-
tor of a local radio station requested that a bilingual disc jock-
ey, Valentine Jurado, use some Spanish while broadcasting on 
the air.72 A consultant for the radio station determined that 
[d. 
67. [d. at 268 n.1. The Fifth Circuit stated: 
While the EEOC has considered in specific instances 
whether a policy prohibiting the speaking of Spanish in 
normal interoffice contacts discriminates on the basis of 
national origin, . . . it has adopted neither a regulation 
stating a standard for testing such language nor any 
general policy, presumed to be derived from the statute, 
prohibiting them. We therefore approach the problem on 
the basis of the statute itself and the case law. 
68. [d. at 272. ("We hold only that an employer's rule forbidding a bilingual 
employee to speak anything but English in public areas while on the job is not 
discrimination based on national origin as applied to a person fully capable of 
speaking English . . . . "). 
69. 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (1993). Whether and to what extent this guideline is 
consistent with the Gloor court's analysis is not entirely clear. The EEOC states 
that § 1606.7 is consistent with Gloor. 
Section 1606.7 does not conflict with the Gloor decision. 
Gloor did not involve a speak English-only rule which was 
applied at all times. Neither did the facts in Gloor in-
volve a bilingual employee whose primary language was 
not English. In the Court's view, Mr. Garcia, who spoke 
both English and Spanish, failed to prove that Spanish 
was his primary language. 
45 Fed. Reg. 85,635 (1980). The Fifth Circuit has not addressed the issues pre-
sented in Gloor since the promulgation of § 1606.7. 
70. 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987). 
71. See Jurado, 813 F.2d 1408-09. Jurado advanced both disparate treatment 
and disparate impact theories to support his claim. See id. at 1409 for the court's 
discussion of Jurado's disparate treatment claim; see also id. at 1412 for the 
court's discussion of Jurado's disparate impact claim. 
72. [d. at 1408. 
13
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Jurado's use of Spanish on the air did not achieve the goals set 
out by management (i.e., to increase the target audience) and 
that Jurado's use of Spanish on the air confused some listen-
ers.73 A new program director told Jurado to stop using Span-
ish on the air.74 Jurado sued, claiming, among other things, 
that the radio station discriminated against him on the basis 
of national origin by discharging him when he refused to com-
. ply with the order.75 The district court granted the radio 
station's motion for summary judgment.76 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's 
dismissal of Jurado's disparate impact claim by stating that 
"[t]he district court found Jurado's only basis for a disparate 
impact claim was the English-only order somehow 
disproportionately disadvantaged Hispanics. The court found 
this theory was without merit as applied to Jurado because 
Jurado was fluently bilingual and could easily conform to the 
order.'m The court cited Garcia v. Gloor for support.7S 
Given the court's use of Gloor in Jurado, it appeared that 
the Ninth Circuit had adopted the Fifth Circuit's rationale for 
upholding English-only rules in the workplace.79 However, in 
1988, the Ninth Circuit, in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court,SO 
began moving away from the Gloor rationale and towards the 
rationale adopted in the EEOC guidelines. 
In Gutierrez, which was subsequently vacated as moot by 
the Supreme Court,St the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of 
73. 1d. 
74. 1d. 
75. See id. at 1408-09. Jurado's disparate treatment claim had several bases. 
One basis for was that the radio station permitted a white disc jockey, Rick Dees, 
to use Spanish on the air while prohibiting Jurado from doing the same. 1d. at 
1410. Another basis was a comment that the consultant made when suggesting 
that Jurado's bilingual format be eliminated suggesting the program was "preoccu-
pied with ethnicity to a frightening degree." 1d. 
76. Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1409. 
77. 1d. at 1412. 
78.1d. 
79. See id. 
80. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989). 
81. Gutierrez, 490 U.S. at 1016. Plaintiff, Alva Gutierrez, had left her job with 
the county clerk and had settled out of court for $85,000 in damages, attorney 
fees and other costs. L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1989, at B2. Judges for the Municipal 
14
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whether an English-only rule instituted by the Municipal 
Court violated Title VII by discriminating against its Hispanic 
employees on the basis of national origin.82 In that case, the 
Municipal Court promulgated an English-only rule forbidding 
"employees to speak any language other than English except 
when acting as translators."83 Gutierrez, a bilingual transla-
tor who worked for the court, sued for injunctive relief.84 The 
district court granted Gutierrez's request for a preliminary 
injunction.85 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's 
order enjoining the Municipal Court from enforcing the rule.86 
The court began by noting that "the cultural identity of certain 
minority groups is tied to the use of their primary 
tongue, ... "87 and that "[t]he mere fact that an employee is 
bilingual does not eliminate the relationship between his pri-
mary language and the culture that is derived from his nation-
al origin."88 The court then expressed its concern that "be-
cause language and accents are identifying characteristics, 
rules which have a negative effect on bilinguals, individuals 
with accents, or non-English speakers, may be mere pretexts 
for intentional national origin discrimination."89 
Court then appealed to the United State8 Supreme Court, petitioning that the case 
should be vacated on procedural grounds. L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1989, at B2. 
82. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d 1031. Gutierrez advanced both a disparate treatment 
and a disparate impact theory to support her claim. Id. at 1036-37. 
83. Id. at 1036. The text of the rule provided that "[tlhe English language 
shall be spoken by all court employees during regular work hours while attending 
to assigned work duties, unless an employee is translating for the non-English-
speaking public. This rule does not apply to employees while on their lunch hour 
or work breaks." Id. at 1037. The municipal court claimed that it adopted this 
rule in order to promote racial harmony, to prevent disruption, to facilitate super-
vision, and to uphold a policy expressed in an amendment to the California Con-
stitution that declared English the official language of state business. Id. at 1042-
43. See Cal. Const. art III, § 6. 
84. Id. at 1036. In addition to injunctive relief, Gutierrez requested monetary 
damages and attorney's fees. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 1045. 
87. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039. (citing James Harvey Domengeaux, Comment, 
Native Born Acadians and the Equality Ideal, 46 LA. L. REv. 1151, 1165-67 
(1986». 
88. Id. (citing Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and 
Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REv. 303, 361-69, 376-77 (1986)) 
89. Id. (citing McArthur, Worried About Something Else, 60 INT'L J. Soc. LAN-
GUAGE 87, 90-91 (1986». 
15
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After citing the EEOC guideline, the court agreed "that 
English-only rules generally have an adverse impact on pro-
tected groups and that they should be closely scrutinized."go 
The court further stated that the EEOC guidelines, "by requir-
ing that a business necessity be shown before a limited Eng-
lish-only rule may be enforced, properly balance the 
individual's interest in speaking his primary language and any 
possible need of the employer to ensure that in particular cir-
cumstances only English shall be spoken. "91 The court adopt-
ed the EEOC's business necessity test as "the proper standard 
for determining the validity of limited English-only rules. "92 
However, in adopting the EEOC's business necessity test, 
the Gutierrez court was forced to recharacterize Jurado by 
stating that "[t]he Jurado rule was considerably more restrict-
ed than and bore little or no resemblance, either in purpose or 
effect, to the edict of the Municipal Court judges. The Jurado 
rule was clearly a reasonable one that met the business necessi-
ty test . ... "gs Thus, Jurado, according to the Gutierrez court, 
became a case where the employer met its burden of showing 
business necessity.94 
Although the Supreme Court vacated Gutierrez as moot, 
Gutierrez still represented the Ninth Circuit's last word on 
90. Id. at 1040. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1041 (emphasis in original). 
94. Id. Judge Kozinski, dissenting from the denial of rehearing Gutierrez en 
bane, wrote: 
Faced with the insuperable problem of Jurado, the 
Gutierrez panel deftly recharacterized it as a case where 
the English-only rule 'met the business necessity test,' 838 
F.2d at 1041 .... Jurado, of course, said no such thing. 
Close examination of the two short paragraphs quoted 
[where the court dealt with the disparate impact claim in 
Jurado) reveals that the words 'business necessity' did not 
find their way into Jurado's discussion of the issue. To 
the contrary, Jurado relied exclusively on Garcia v. Gloor, 
[618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980}) which rejected the business 
necessity test. In ham-handed fashion, the Gutierrez panel 
throws Jurado's rationale out the window and substitutes 
its own. 
Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 861 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1988) (denial of re-
hearing en bane) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citation added). 
16
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English-only rules in the workplace. When the district court's 
decision in Spun Steak was appealed, the question was wheth-
er the panel would follow the Gutierrez court's rationale or the 
Jurado court's rationale. 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY 
The majority first addressed the threshold issue of wheth-
er disparate impact claims may be brought under § 703(a)(1), 
concluding that such claims may be brought under § 703(a)(1). 
The court next addressed whether plaintiffs established a pri-
ma facie case. Finally, the court examined three arguments 
advanced by the plaintiffs and concluded that plaintiffs failed 
to establish a prima facie case.95 
1. Whether Disparate Impact Claims May Be Brought Under 
§ 703(a)(1) 
The Ninth Circuit in Spun Steak first considered whether 
a disparate impact claim96 could be brought under Title VII § 
703(a)(1) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as amended.97 The court 
95. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993), reh'g en bane 
denied, 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 114 S.Ct. 2726 (1994). 
96. See supra notes 28·38 and accompanying text for a discussion on disparate 
impact. 
97. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485. See supra note 40 for the text of § 703(a). 
The court noted that traditionally a disparate impact claim is brought under Title 
VII section 703(a)(2) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. [d. This is chiefly due to the 
language of the statute. The court stated: 
[d. 
[Tlhe cases in which we have concluded that plaintiff has 
proved discrimination based on a disparate impact theory 
have all involved plaintiffs who claimed that they were 
denied employment opportunities as the result of artificial, 
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers that excluded memo 
bers of a protected group from being hired or promoted. 
Since "employment opportunities" is language that is extracted from section 
703(a)(2), such claims were logically thought to arise under this section. [d. Garcia 
and Buitrago argued that the English·only rule imposed a burdensome term or 
condition on their employment and also denied them a privilege accorded to other 
employees, namely monolingual speakers of English. [d. The court reasoned that 
terms and conditions of employment does not fall within the ambit of section 
703(a)(2), but rather within the ambit of section 703(a)(1). [d. 
17
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noted that neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court 
had expressly considered this issue.98 The Ninth Circuit held 
that a disparate impact claim could be brought under § 
703(a)(1), stating that there is "no reason to restrict the appli-
cation of the disparate impact theory to the denial of employ-
ment opportunities under § 703(a)(2)."99 Since the issue of 
whether a disparate impact claim can be brought under § 
703(a)(1) involves statutory interpretation, the Ninth Circuit 
partially justified its holding by noting that "[t]he Supreme 
Court has instructed that the language of § 703(a)(1) is to be 
interpreted broadly."loo 
Next, the court examined whether the language of § 
703(a)(1) could support a disparate impact claim.lol The court 
cited Lynch v. Freeman,102 a Sixth Circuit decision, to support 
its determination that disparate impact claims could be sus-
tained under § 703(a)(1).103 
98. Id. The court was in error; the Ninth Circuit had previously decided 
whether a disparate impact claim may be brought under section 703(a)(1). In May 
1983, the court decided Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984). The Ninth Circuit held that "[tlhis is an 
unusual disparate impact case because it alleges a violation of § 703(a)(1) of the 
Act: discrimination with respect to 'compensations, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment.'" Wambheim, 705 F.2d at 1494 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 
(emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the disparate impact analysis 
was appropriate. Wambheim, 705 F.2d at 1494. 
99. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485. 
100. Id. The Ninth Circuit drew this inference from a statement that the Su-
preme Court made in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), a sexu-
al harassment case which involved the issue of whether a victim of sexual harass-
ment who filed a claim pursuant to Title VII § 703(a)(1) could recover for psycho-
logical damages. The Court reasoned that remuneration under Title VII was not 
limited to economic damages since "the phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment.m Id. at 64. 
101. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485. 
102. 817 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1987). In Lynch, a female construction worker, who 
was terminated from her job, sued her employer contending, among other things, 
that his failure to provide properly sanitized toilet facilities discriminated against 
her by creating work conditions that adversely impacted female employees. Id. at 
386-87. The employer contended that any claim involving discrimination with re-
spect to work conditions falls within the language of § 703(a)(1), which requires 
discriminatory intent to be shown. Id. The Sixth Circuit upheld the female 
worker's disparate impact claim. Id. at 389. 
103. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485-86 (citing Lynch, 817 F.2d 380) ("We are 
satisfied that a disparate impact claim may be based upon a challenge to a prac-
tice or policy that has a significant adverse impact on the 'terms, conditions, or 
18
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2. Prima Facie Case 
The Ninth Circuit next considered whether the Spanish-
speaking employees established their prima facie case.104 The 
court stated that under disparate impact analysis, a plaintiff 
must "do more than merely raise an inference of discrimination 
before the burden shifts."105 The court noted that in a typical 
disparate impact case, the plaintiff "proves discriminatory 
impact by showing statistical disparities between the number 
of protected class members in the qualified applicant group 
and those in the relevant segment of the workforce.,,106 How-
ever, the court recognized that when the "alleged disparate im-
pact is on the conditions, terms or privileges of employ-
ment ... determining whether the protected group has been 
adversely affected may depend on subjective factors not easily 
quantified. "107 The court concluded that although proving the 
alleged impact may be more difficult under these circumstanc-
es, this fact "does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of 
proving disparate impact.'Hos The mere assertion that the 
English-only rule harms members of the protected group is 
insufficient. l09 
In addition, the majority fashioned a four-part test to 
determine whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie 
case. The test provides that in order to establish a prima facie 
case a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the existence of adverse 
effects of the policy; (2) that the impact of the policy is on 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the protected 
class; (3) that the adverse effects are significant; and (4) that 
the employee population in general is not affected by the policy 
to the same degree.11o 
The Spanish-speaking employees advanced three argu-
privileges' of the employment of a protected group under section 703(a)(1)."). 
104. [d. at 1486. 
105. [d. 
106. [d. The court noted that while such statistics are difficult to gather, at 
least the evidence of discrimination is quantifiable. [d. 
107. [d. 
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ments in order to establish their prima facie case, each of 
which the court examined and rejected in turn. First, the 
Spanish-speaking employees argued that the rule denied them 
the "ability to express their cultural heritage on the job."lll 
Second, they argued that the rule denied them "a privilege of 
employment that is enjoyed by monolingual speakers of Eng-
lish."112 Third, they argued that the rule "create[d] an atmo-
sphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation. "113 
The court quickly dismissed the first argument by noting 
that Title VII "does not protect the ability of workers to ex-
press their cultural heritage at the workplace.114 Title VII is 
concerned only with disparities in the treatment of workers; it 
does not confer substantive privileges."115 
The court dismissed the second argument by noting that 
while the ability to converse on the job is a privilege of employ-
ment,11S the very nature of a privilege is that it is defined at 
the discretion of the employer.1l7 The employer may define 
the privilege either broadly or narrowly. us Where the em-
ployer chooses to define the privilege narrowly by enacting an 
English-only rule, employees who are bilingual cannot be ad-
versely impacted since the language that they use at a particu-
lar time is, by definition, a matter of choice.119 Thus, the 
court reasoned that while the rule may inconvenience some 
bilingual employees, Title VII was not meant to protect against 
policies that merely inconvenience members of a protected 
class.120 Rather, "Title VII protects against only those policies 
that have a significant impact."121 However, the court ob-
111. [d. at 1486-87. 
112. [d. at 1487. 
113. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487. 
114. [d. 
115. [d. 
116. [d. The court noted that such a privilege may be a significant privilege for 
workers who work on the assembly-line. [d. 
117. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487. 
118. [d. For example, an employer may "proscribe certain topics as inappropri-
ate during working hours or may even forbid the use of certain words, such as 
profanity." [d. 
119. [d. 
120. [d. at 1487-88. 
121. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488 (emphasis in original). 
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served that the very existence of an English-only rule might 
have an adverse impact on a speaker who could not speak 
English. 122 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the third argument by noting 
that the Supreme Court of the United States, in Meritor Sav-
ings Bank v. Vinson,123 held that "an abusive work environ-
ment may, in some circumstances, amount to a condition of 
employment .... "124 However, the Ninth Circuit character-
ized Meritor as stating that the hostile work environment 
"must be pervasive before an employee has a Title VII claim 
under a hostile environment theory."125 Although the Span-
ish-speaking employees urged the court to adopt a per se rule 
that English-only rules will always create a hostile work envi-
ronment, the Ninth Circuit declined to do SO.126 Rather, the 
court viewed the inquiry as a question of fact "for which a per 
se rule is particularly inappropriate."127 Any inquiry "must 
look to the totality of the circumstances in the particular factu-
al context in which the claim arises."I26 The court noted that 
conclusory statements that the rule has contributed to an at-
mosphere of isolation, inferiority and intimidation are not 
122. [d. The court remanded the case as to one employee who could not speak 
any English in order to determine whether the existence of the rule adversely 
impacted her. [d. at 1490. The court stated that this is a question of fact for 
which summary judgment is inappropriate. [d. 
123. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
124. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66). Section 
703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights act of 1964 forbids an employer from discriminating 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
In Meritor, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an employee 
may bring a claim arising under Title VII § 703(a)(1) for sexual harassment where 
an employer's conduct amounts to a work condition by creating a hostile and of-
fensive environment with which the employee must contend. Mentor, 477 U.S. at 
66. In that case, a bank employee sued her employer contending that unwelcome 
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and verbal suggestions created an 
offensive environment that amounted to a condition of employment for purposes of 
Title VII. [d. at 60. The Court held that such conduct where the purpose or effect 
of it creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment, may prop-
erly be the basis of a Title VII § 703(a)(1) claim. See id. at 66. 
125. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489. 
126. [d. The Spanish-speaking employees relied on EEOC guideline section 
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sufficient.129 Since the Spanish-speaking employees offered no 
evidence apart from conclusory statements to show that the 
policy created a hostile work environment, the court ruled that 
they did not establish a prima facie case .130 
In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit rejected the employees' use 
of an EEOC Guideline that enables a plaintiff to establish a 
prima facie case merely by showing the existence of an Eng-
lish-only rule. l3l Although the court noted that the guidelines 
"constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to 
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guid-
ance,"132 the majority added that "we are not bound by the 
guidelines."133 Further, the court stated that it would not 
defer to "an administrative construction of a statute where 
there are 'compelling indications that it is wrong.",134 
129. Id. 
130. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489. According to the court, "the bilingual 
employees have not raised a genuine issue of material fact that the effect is so 
pronounced as to amount to a hostile environment." Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986». 
133. Id. (citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973». 
134. Id. (quoting Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 94-95). 
In its decisions, the United States Supreme Court has enumerated a num-
ber of factors which are relevant in determining whether to defer to EEOC guide-
lines. First, the court looks to the language of the statute to determine whether 
the guideline is in accord. Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88 ("[T]he plain language of the 
statute supports the result reached by the Court of Appeals [refusing to defer to 
EEOC guidelines]."). Second, the court examines legislative history to further inter-
pret the language of the statute. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434 (finding the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act and its legislative history supporting the EEOC's construction of section 
703(h»; Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88-89 ("The statute's legislative history, though 
quite meager, supports [the EEOC's] construction."). 
Third, the courts may, if necessary, examine whether the guideline is consis-
tent with historical and current federal policy. Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 89-9l. 
Fourth, courts can examine the guidelines' consistency with prior and subse-
quent case law. See Gutierrez v.Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1049 (9th Cir. 
1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989). The Gutierrez court found that the 
EEOC guidelines regarding English-only rules conflicted with the prior case of 
Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 133 (1981). As 
such the Gutierrez court found that the EEOC guidelines did not constitute estab-
lished law. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1049. The court stated: 
We need not decide in this case, whether, in the absence 
of decisional law, EEOC guidelines and decisions can 
constitute clearly established law. Here, judicial precedent 
existed and it appears to have been inconsistent, at least 
in part, with the guidelines. If the contrary judicial prece-
dent had been issued subsequent to the guidelines, there 
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According to the Ninth Circuit, nothing in the plain lan-
guage of Title VII § 703(a)(1) supported the EEOC interpreta-
tion of the statute.135 The majority justified its conclusion by 
stating that the enactment of the statute could not have been 
accomplished without the "substantial support from legislators 
in both Houses who traditionally resisted federal regulation of 
private business."136 Finally, the court noted that "Congress 
intended a balance to be struck in preventing discrimination 
and preserving the independence of the employer, ... the Su-
preme Court has held that a plaintiff in a disparate impact 
case must prove the alleged discriminatory effect before the 
burden shifts to the employer.,,137 Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded, the Guideline "contravenes that policy by presum-
ing that an English-only policy has a disparate impact in the 
absence of proof. "138 
is no question that we would hold that the guidelines do 
not 'clearly establish' the law. Although the answer is not 
as certain when the guidelines are issued after a decision, 
where that decision has been rendered by a federal circuit 
court and the subsequently issued guidelines remain 
largely untested, we think it appropriate to reach the 
same conclusion. Thus, we hold that in the case before us 
the EEOC guidelines did not serve to clearly establish the 
law regarding the validity of English-only rules. 
ld. (emphasis in original). 
Finally, the court may also look to the process by which the EEOC passed 
its guidelines, examining "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validi-
ty of its reasoning, [and) its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements." 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140'(1944) (cited with approval in General 
Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976»; see EEOC v. Arabian American 
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991). 
In Gilbert, the Court found that the EEOC guideline did not fare well un-
der the Skidmore standards. One factor used in the Court's analysis was that the 
guideline was not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII, but was instead 
promulgated in 1972, eight years after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 142. 
135. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489. 
136. ld. (quoting United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 
(1979». The court further justified this policy argument by stating that "[i)ntemal 
affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be interfered with except to 
the limited extent that correction is required in discrimination practices." ld. at 
1490 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88 Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2516) (Statement of William M. McCulloch) (quoted in part in 
Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 206). 
137. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490. 
138. ld. 
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B. THE DISSENT 
Judge Boochever disagreed with the majority's rejection of 
the EEOC Guideline, 139 and would have deferred to the 
EEOC's expertise in construing the Act.14D The dissent noted 
that although an EEOC guideline "[is] entitled to somewhat 
less weight than those promulgated by an agency with Con-
gressionally delegated rulemaking authority,"141 it is never-
theless "entitled to 'great deference' in the absence of 'compel-
ling indications that it is wrong.,"142 Here, Judge Boochever 
found no such compelling indications. 143 Judge Boochever 
would have deferred to the EEOC guideline and upheld the 
district court's determination that plaintiffs had established 
their prima facie case.144 In addition, Judge Boochever would 
have remanded the case to establish whether the company had 
a business justification for instituting the English-only 
rule. 145 
V. CRITIQUE 
This critique will (1) show that the EEOC Guideline relied 
upon by plaintiffs is inconsistent with congressional intent and 
judicial policy; (2) show that the court's opinion in Spun Steak 
failed to provide the guidance necessary to assist lower courts 
in determining how plaintiffs may establish their prima facie 
139. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (Boochever, J., dis-
senting in part). 
140. [d. In fact, the dissent noted that the difficulty of establishing a prima 
facie case by using subjective factors alone and without making conclusory state-
ments would be very difficult. [d. Boochever stated that this "may well have been 
one of the reasons for the promulgation of the guideline. On the other hand, it 
should not be difficult for an employer to give specific reasons for the policy, such 
as the safety reasons advanced in this case." [d. 
141. [d. (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976». 
142. [d. at 1490-91 (quoting Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 
(1973». 
143. [d. at 1491. Judge Boochever found that the lack of directly supporting 
language in either § 703(a)(1) or the legislative history of Title VII, relied on by 
the majority, did not make the guideline inconsistent with congressional intent. [d. 
144. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1491. 
145. Id. However, unlike the district court, the dissent thought that whether 
the company had sufficient business justification for establishing the policy provid-
ed triable issues of fact, making a motion for summary judgment inappropriate. 
[d. 
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case; and (3) advance an alternate approach whereby English-
only rules would be classified as facially discriminatory, allow-
ing claims of discrimination to be brought under the disparate 
treatment theory. 
A. THE EEOC GUIDELINES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH JUDICIAL 
POLICY AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
In Spun Steak,146 a divided panel held that the EEOC 
guideline relied upon by the plaintiffs was inconsistent with 
Title VII. 147 While the court relied upon the plain 
languagel46 and legislative history149 of § 703(a) in reaching 
its decision, it virtually ignored the most compelling reason for 
rejecting the guideline, namely, that the guideline violates both 
the judicial policy of requiring a plaintiff to establish a prima 
facie case and the plain language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.150 
146. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), reh'g en banc denied, 
13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2726 
(1994). 
147. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489-90. Judge Boochever, dissenting in part, 
would have deferred to the EEOC guideline, finding no compelling indications that 
the guideline was wrong. [d. at 1490-91. 
148. [d. at 1489. 
149. [d. at 1489-90. Judge Reinhardt, dissenting from the decision to deny a 
rehearing of Spun Steak en banc, attacked the majority's rejection of the Guide-
line. Reinhardt stated: "[tlhough acknowledging that only 'compelling indications' 
that the Guideline was erroneous would justify rejecting it, the majority makes 
only a token effort to abide by this standard, dedicating less than a page describ-
ing its 'compelling' reasons for invalidating the Guideline." Spun Steak, 13 F.3d at 
299. Judge Reinhardt added that: 
[d. at 300. 
the Spun Steak majority cites as a reason for its decision 
the absence of legislative history regarding Title VII's 
applicability to English-only rules. 998 F.2d at 1490. With 
this argument, the majority elevates legislative history to 
a new height. Those who believe that even affirmative 
legislative history is, in general, not compelling maybe 
surprised to learn that its absence can be so crucial as to 
constitute a basis for invalidating an agency rule. See, 
e.g., United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co . ... 
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (describing legislative 
history as 'that last hope of lost interpretative causes, 
that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction'). 
150. Although the majority asserted that adopting the EEOC's position would 
contravene the general policy that plaintiffs must establish their prima facie cases, 
the court marshalled little support to prove its proposition. The court stated that 
Supreme Court's policy of requiring plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of 
25
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Since the Supreme Court first fashioned the disparate 
impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power CO. 151 in 1971, federal 
courts, including the Ninth Circuit prior to Gutierrez v. Munici-
pal Court,152 have required plaintiffs to prove significant ad-
verse impact before the burden shifts to the defendant to dem-
onstrate business justification.153 Thus, the EEOC's burden-
shifting scheme under § 1606.7 of the guidelineslD4 could be 
construed as an executive agency's attempt to reshape judicial 
policy. 
Moreover, the EEOC guideline appears to contradict 
Congress' most recent enunciation of its policy concerning 
prima facie cases in disparate impact claims. Congress enacted 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991/55 in part, to reverse several Su-
preme Court decisions that had narrowed the scope of civil 
rights protections,156 particularly several aspects of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Anto-
nio.157 However, the Act also codified the standard set out in 
Ward's Cove for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case.15S 
discriminatory impact stemmed from Congress' desire to strike a balance between 
preventing discrimination and preserving the independence of the employer. Spun 
Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490. Beyond quoting Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 266, a case 
decided eight years after Griggs, the Ninth Circuit provided no support for their 
statement that this "balance" was the reason for the policy that plaintiffs establish 
a prima facie case. 
151. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
152. 861 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989). 
153. For example, in Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 
1987), the Ninth Circuit dismissed Jurado's disparate impact claim for failure to 
establish a prima facie case. Id. at 1412. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying 
text for discussion of the facts and holding of Jurado. 
154. See supra note 55 for the text of § 1606.7. 
155. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) 
156. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 2(4). See generally, Donald O. Johnson, Com-
ment, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Disparate Impact: The Response to Fac-
tionalism, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 469 (1992) (discussing recent Supreme Court deci-
sions and Congress' response in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
157. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) ("[T)he employer carries the burden of producing evi-
dence of a business justification for his employment practice."). Id. at 659. The 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 alters the defendant's burden from that in Ward's Cove. 
The Act requires the defendant to demonstrate that the challenged business prac-
tice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessi-
ty. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i». The 
Act defines "demonstrate" as meeting "the burdens of production and persuasion." 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 104 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m». 
158. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i». 
The court in Ward's Cove held that "[aJs a general matter, a plaintiff must demon-
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The pertinent part of § 105 reads: "With respect to demonstrat-
ing that a particular employment practice causes a disparate 
impact ... the complaining party shall demonstrate that each 
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate 
impact .... "169 According to the 1991 Act, "demonstrate" 
means to carry both the burdens of production and persua-
sion.lso 
The EEOC guidelines, however, place the initial burden on 
the employer to demonstrate business necessity before enacting 
an English-only rule.161 Under the guideline, the employee 
need only prove the existence of an English-only rule before 
the burden shifts/s2 the plaintiff need not persuade the court 
that the English-only rule has adversely impacted a member or 
members of the protected group since such rules are presumed 
to create an adverse impact. l63 Thus, the guideline appears to 
violate the plain language of the 1991 Civil Rights Act by by-
passing the Act's requirement that a plaintiff meet his burdens 
of production and persuasion in a disparate impact claim be-
fore the burden shifts to the employer. It would therefore be 
reasonable to conclude that the guideline in question in Spun 
Steak would be rejected under the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 164 
strate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that 
is under attack." Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. The Court added that the burden 
of persuasion remains with the disparate impact plaintiff, and "the ultimate bur-
den of proving that discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a 
specific employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times." Id. at 659 
(quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997 (1988» (emphasis 
in Ward's Cove). 
159. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i)). 
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (1991). 
161. See supra note 55 for the text to 29 C.F.R. -§ 1606.7. 
162. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a). 
163. Id. 
164. With regard to Title VII as it existed prior to the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, the codification of the Ward's Cove standard can be viewed as 
Congressional approval of the way the Court has handled this aspect of disparate 
impact claims. Since the guideline at issue runs counter to the policies set forth 
by both the Supreme Court and by Congress, the majority in Spun Steak could 
rightly have found "compelling indications" that the guideline was wrong. 
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B. SPUN STEAK FAILED To PROVIDE GUIDANCE To LOWER 
COURTS 
In Spun Steak, the court focused on whether the English-
only rule had an adverse impact on employees; and if so, 
whether that impact was significant.165 The court concluded 
that an English-only rule, in and of itself, does not create a 
significant adverse impact on bilingual employees.166 The 
court, however, distinguished bilingual employees from non-
English speaking employees by stating that "'to a person who 
speaks only one tongue or to a person who has difficulty using 
another language than the one spoken in his home,' an Eng-
lish-only rule might well have an adverse impact. "167 There-
fore, the classification of employees as bilingual or other than 
bilingual, becomes important because the way a court classifies 
an employee is likely to affect whether or not a court will find 
that the rule has significantly impacted that employee. Accord-
ing to the majority's view, the question turns on the facility 
that the employee has with the English language. l68 The 
more proficient an employee is in English, the less impact an 
English-only rule will have on that employee since his ability 
to exercise his privilege is not as drastically curtailed. 
However, the Ninth Circuit provided no guidance on how 
an employee's facility with English might be judged. It is not 
clear, for example, whether proficiency in English is a fluid 
concept that may change with the particular work environment 
165. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993). 
166. Id. The court stated: 
Title VII is not meant to protect against rules that mere-
ly inconvenience some employees, even if the inconve-
nience falls regularly on a protected class. Rather, Title 
VII protects against only those policies that have a signif- . 
icant impact. The fact that an employee may have to 
catch himself or herself from occasionally slipping into 
Spanish does not impose a burden significant enough to 
amount to the denial of equal opportunity. 
Id.(emphasis in original); cf. Cox v. American Cast Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1561 
(11th Cir. 1986) ("Title VII gives us no license to decide that any injury, however 
insignificant, may be regarded as de minimis. AB appellant argues, '[w)hat is small 
in principal is often large in principle.'") (quoting Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 
F.2d 28, 32-33 (5th Cir. 1968) (footnote omitted», cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986). 
167. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488. 
168. Id. 
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or whether it is an absolute standard that must be met regard-
less of the work environment. Moreover, if it is an absolute 
standard, the court has not stated what level of proficiency 
meets that standard. Such unanswered questions are likely to 
lead to further litigation. 
c. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
Professor Juan F. Perea169 has observed that most courts, 
when confronted with whether an English-only rule violates 
Title VII, have proceeded under the assumption that such 
rules are facially neutral.170 In fact, no reported decision has 
examined the validity of an English-only rule has even ana-
lyzed this assumption, let alone questioned it.l7l However, 
according to Perea, this assumption has only "superficial ap-
peal."172 Facially discriminatory policies are policies that on 
their face explicitly treat people differently based upon some 
prohibited classification such as race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin.173 Perea argues that English-only rules differ 
"in kind from the facially neutral rules usually analyzed under 
the disparate impact model," because the effects of English-
only rules fall exclusively on members in the protected group 
while the effects of facially neutral rules falls on members both 
inside and outside the protected groUp.174 Perea argues that 
such exclusive adverse effects coupled with the close correla-
tion between primary language and national origin provides a 
strong argument for challenging English-only rules under a 
disparate treatment theory, not a disparate impact theory.175 
Professor Perea has analogized English-only rules to em-
ployment practices that discriminate on the basis of pregnan-
169. Juan F. Perea, English·only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary 
Language in the Workplace, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 265 (1990). 
170. Perea, supra note 169, at 289. 
171. [d. Perea notes that no one, including the EEOC and the litigants in Gloor 
or Gutierrez has challenged the assumption that English-only policies are facially 
neutral. [d. 
172. [d. 
173. See De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1978). 
174. Perea, supra note 169, at 289. 
175. See id. at 292-93. 
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cy.176 Prior to the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act (hereinafter "PDA") in 1978,177 the United States Su-
preme Court, in General Electric v. Gilbert,178 had ruled that 
policies which differentiated among employees because ofpreg-
nancy were facially neutral and did not discriminate on the 
basis of sex.179 Congress amended Title VII by enacting the 
. PDA which included pregnancy, childbirth, and related condi-
tions under the definition of discrimination on the basis of 
sex.180 Congress adopted the views of several of the dissent-
ing Justices in Gilbert.181 
According to Perea, "a correct interpretation of Title VII 
requires treating characteristics that are closely correlated 
with a protected characteristic the same as the explicitly pro-
tected characteristic when such characteristics are used as the 
basis of discrimination that results in an exclusive adverse 
effect upon a protected groUp."182 The inevitable conclusion, 
as Perea notes, is that "Ulust as ... discrimination because of 
pregnancy is the same as discrimination because of sex, so . . . 
176. Id. at 293·94. 
177. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 
(1988». 
178. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
179. See id. at 136. 
180. Section 701(k) of Title VII provides the following: 
The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, 
but are not limited to, because of or on the basi8 of preg-
nancy, childbirth, or medical conditions; and women affect-
ed by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions 
shall be treated the same for all employment-related pur-
poses, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit 
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in 
their ability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of 
this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988). 
181. H.R. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4749, 4750. 
In Gilbert, Justice Brennan stated, "Surely it offends common sense to sug-
gest . . . that a classification revolving around pregnancy is not, at a minimum, 
strongly 'sex related.'" Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
Justice Stevens stated that "the rule at issue places the risk of absence 
caused by pregnancy in a class by itself. By definition, such a rule discriminates 
on the basis of sex; for it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily 
differentiates the female from the male." Id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted). 
182. Perea, supra note 169, at 294. 
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discrimination because of primary language ... is the same as 
discrimination because of national origin."183 
Perea's theory is not without problems. Pregnancy corre-
lates completely with gender; only women can become preg-
nant. However, language is only "closely correlated" to national 
origin.184 Just how "closely correlated" a primary language is 
to national origin is likely to be a matter of dispute. 185 
Perea's approach, however, has several distinct advantag-
es. First, Perea's approach would allow a plaintiff to establish 
a prima facie case merely by showing the existence of an Eng-
lish-only rule, thereby avoiding the necessity of using subjec-
tive factors to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. 
Second, by classifying English-only rules as per se discrimina-
tory, and allowing them to be analyzed under the disparate 
treatment theory, the problems inherent in the EEOC's bur-
den-shifting scheme are avoided. Third, Perea's approach is 
also consistent with both judicial policy and Congressional 
intent. Finally, since future claims against employers will be 
subject to the terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1991/86 Perea's 
theory provides a better balance between the interests of em-
ployers and employees. Under Perea's approach, an employee 
need only prove the existence of an English-only rule to estab-
lish a prima facie case. The employer's burden under Perea's 
approach is also lessened since the employer need only produce 
evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory alternative. 
183. See id. 
184. [d. at 293. 
185. The Ninth Circuit has not explicitly equated primary language with nation-
al origin. The majority in Spun Steak did state that "(iJt cannot be gainsaid that 
an individual's primary language can be an important link to his ethnic culture 
and identity." Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487. However, the majority also stated 
that it was impressed with the Gloor court's analysis. [d. at 1489. The Gloor court 
noted "[nleither ... [Title VIII nor common understanding equates national origin 
with the language that one chooses to speak." Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268. 
186. See supra notes 155-160 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
changes the Civil Rights Act of 1991 has made regarding disparate impact claims. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Although the Ninth Circuit in Spun Steak properly reject-
ed the EEOC's guideline, it failed to provide the most compel-
ling reason for doing so. The guideline's burden-shifting 
scheme is inconsistent with case law dating back to Griggs 
which mandates that a plaintiff must establish a prima facie 
case of disparate impact. Moreover, the court failed to question 
the implicit assumption that English-only rules are facially 
neutral. By adopting Perea's approach to English-only rules, 
the court would simplify any actions challenging an employer's 
English-only rule by analyzing such challenges under the dis-
parate treatment approach. The plaintiff's burden would be 
lessened to establish a prima facie case, and the burden that 
would shift to the employer would only be that of production, 
not production and persuasion. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994. 
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